This , article outlines the history of the Remuneration Act and Regulations, 1979-80 • ' The Remune.,ation Act deserves consideration. It was ushered into the living rooms of the nation by the Prime Minister himself; it provoked the general strike of 1979 and prolon, ged the 198' 0 K.inleith dispute; it stimulated the frrst period of intense conflict between the Government and unions in New , Zealand's history which did not leave the union movement wẽakened and demo. ralized; it , gave th~ unions two causes for celebration in one year.
' The Remune.,ation Act deserves consideration. It was ushered into the living rooms of the nation by the Prime Minister himself; it provoked the general strike of 1979 and prolon, ged the 198' 0 K.inleith dispute; it stimulated the frrst period of intense conflict between the Government and unions in New , Zealand's history which did not leave the union movement wẽakened and demo. ralized; it , gave th~ unions two causes for celebration in one year.
A Brief Histõry
On 6 July 1979 the Federation of Labour lodged with the Arbitration Court an application for a minimum living wage order in te1n1s of the General Wage Orders Act, 1977 . On 24 July, , before the ap. plication had been heard by the Court, the Prime Minister, , Robert Muldoon, announced, in a simultaneous television and radio broadcast, that the Government intended to repeal thẽ General Wage Orders Act, issue a general increase of 4.5 percent and ẽmpower itself to regulate specific wages and conditions. The Remune~ation Act was ' introduced into Parliament on 27 July and became law on 10 August. Under it, regulations could be issued for two purposes: to make general adjustments to wages and to set wage rates and conditions for specific groups of workers. Two Remuner:ation (General Increase) Rẽgulations were issued under the Act. The frrst provided for a 4.5 percent general incfiease effective from 3 September 1979; the second, a four percent general increase from 1 August 1980.
On four occasions Remuneration Regulations were threatened or used to intervene in award settlements. Thẽ first in, volved the general drivers' award. After three months of negotiations broken by strike action, the New Zealand Drivers' Federation and the Road Transport Association reached agreement on an II percent basic wage increase with additional allowances. Before the agreement was finalized, the Prime Minister warned that the Government would issue Rẽmuneration Regulations to reduce the basic increase to 9.5 percent and would ensure that the employers could not pass the settlement on in increased charges (foreshadowing the Commerce Amendment Bill introduced on 18 September 1'979). The Fedẽration of Labour responded by calling a general strike on
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Y OF WE~ L ~ GTON 2 2~ ~eptember. After four days of uncertainty following the strike, a suggestion from the M~mster of Labour, Jim Bolger, that the case should go to arbitration was accepted by the drivers. The Government undertook to accept the Court's decision ~ather than issue Remuneration Regulations. On 5 October the Arbitration Court announced an award which gave the drivers virtually what their employers had conceded a month earlier but in a different form. ' The second intervention was the issuing without warning on 12 October of the Remuneration (Aucklllnd, Canterbury, Westlllnd and Hawke~ Bay Bulk Freight Forwarrlers (Stores) E,mployees Award) xegu/lltions 1979 (referred to here as the freight forwarders' regulations). The primary purpose was to alter an agreement, reached early in October after sporadic industrial action dating back to December 1978 for a new allowance of . ' $6.40 per week for the handling of dangerous chemicals. The rest of the award was due to be decided in conciliation on 29 October. The Regulations pre~mpted this, establishing basic increases in the award at the trend rate for the wage round -10.4 percent. The chemical handling allowance was reduced to $1.80 per week. After initial protests the Federation of Labour decided on 25 October not to take further action in response to the reduction of the allowance, and the freight forwarders themselves fmally accepted it in November 1979.
The third intervention came on 26 February 1980 with the signing of the Remuneration (New Zealand Engine Driven, Boiler Attendllnts, Firemen and Greaen AMIIU'd) Regulations 1980 (referred to here as the engine drivers' regulations). Again these followed bouts of direct action over a period of several months, this time in support of a registration allowance. The Regulations prohibited the introduction of new provisions into the award, thereby preventing registration allowances from being included. The level of wages for the award was not set by regulation.
The final use of Remuneration Regulations to alter a wage settlement was the Remuneration (New Zealand Forest Products) Regulations, 1980 (referred to here as the Kinleith regulations) which applied to all unions at the New Zealand Forest Products mill at Kinleith, Tokoroa, except the pulp and paper workers. After eight weeks of strike action, the company had agreed to the combined union claim for parity with rates paid at the Tasman Pulp and Paper Company's mill at Kawerau. The 20.5 percent increase which this gave to Kinleith workers restored relativities lost when Tasman workers' rates moved ahead of Kinleith's in the 1978-79 wage round. The Government objected to the size of the proposed increase, arguing that the combined unions should have pairty with pulp and paper workers who had settled· for 18 percent in January 1980. Accordingly, regulations were signed on 3 March which gave the combined unions an 18 percent increase. The strik~ continued with strong support from the Federation of Labour and other unions until the Government agreed to withdraw the regulations. On 26 March, the RevOCtltion of Remuneration (New Zealand Forest Products) Regullltiom, 1980, were signed, restoring the settlement to that reached on 24 February.
As one of the conditions for the withdrawal of the Kinleith regulations, the Federation of Labour agreed to take part in tripartite wage policy discussions which began on 24 April. During May, the Federation of Labour and the Combined State Unions initiated a campaign in defence of living standards, demanding a restoration of regular general wage orders, an immediate cost-of-living adjustment and the repeal of the Remuneration Act.
The tripartite talks produced an interim accord for the 1980-81 wage round on 6 August. In return for a 'reasonable' wage settlement in the round, the Government agreed that the Remuneration Act would be repealed and the Arbitration Court could hear a case for a general cost-of-living adjustment to wages. The Remuneration Act Repet~l BiB received its first reading on 14 August 1980, and, after a nationwide television and radio broadcast by the Prime Minister, announcing the reasons for the Act's repeal, t~ Remuneration Act was signed out of existence on 4 November 1980. Regulations 1980 (referred to here as the engine drivers' regula bouts of direct action over a period of several months, this time allowance. The Regulations prohibited the introduction of ne thereby preventing registration allowances from being include award was not set by regulation.
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The Impact of the Remuneration Act, 1979 Act, -1980 The Remuneration Act as an Instrument of Wages Policy All New Zealand governments since 1971 have adopted a variety of wage strategies to curb inflation (Martin, 1981 . • p.S) and to control the wage fixing process (Walsh, 1979, pp.l 3 and 15). Direct wage controls were used between 1971 and 1977. There was a return to a general wage order systẽm and freer bargaining between 1977 and 1979. This was abandoned in favour of a policy of selective intervention ẽnshrined in the Remuneration Act, before tripartite talks were tried in 1980 and 1981 (Martin, pp.S-7). This article considers the Remunderation Act in this context, leaving aside the qu· estion of whose economic interests the Government was seeking to serve by the Act.
The Minister of Labour's speeches during August 1979 rẽveal the pragmatism of the Gove. mment's approach. Bolger rejected a system in which the Government played no role in wage fixing as inoperable in New Zealand because the protected sector of the economy could pass on · wage increases but the , export sector could not. At the other extreme, the Government had lost faith . in wage controls also. Between 1971 and 1977 these had compressed margins for skill, distorted relativities, hardened attitudes between employers and workers and by 1976 contributed to the highest level of industrial activity for two decadẽs. Wage controls were seen as inflexible, and capable of evasion. Accordingly, the Government had lifted controls and reintroduced the general wage order system in 1977, on the understanding that wage bargaining would be "socially responsible". But by 1979 it was disillusioned with this policy too, because it believed that many unions were obtaining excessive wage settlements or receiving double compensation for inflation.
Through the R, e, munet7ation Act, the Minister said, the Government was looking for a different path to "responsible fr, ee wage bargaining". , which would encourage the settlement of wage disputes without industrial action. , at levels consistẽnt with the interests of the economy and the community, yet enable the Government to intervene if this did not occur.
From the outset the Government said that it was possible that the R, emuneration Act would be an interim measure, the duration depending on the outcome of talks it hoped to hold with employers and trade unions about new methods of wage fixing. This essentially pragmatic approach helps to explain why the Government was prepared to abandon the Act in 1980, in exchange for tripartite wage talks.
There · were two wage fixing components to the Remuneration Act. The first was provision for the establishment of general increases by regulation; the second the introduction of a policy of selective intervention in wage fixing. Direct government determination of general increases is not new. Economic Stabilisation Regulations provided wa, ge orders in August 1'973 and February 1974, as did Wage Adjustment Regulations from 1974 to 1977.
The catalyst for repeal of the 1977 general wage order system was the Federation of Labour's application for a minimum living wage order. Government members expressed fears that this would lead to more unemployment, a more rigid labour market and massive wage rises. They asserted that the Arbitration Court was an inappropriate forum and the general · wage order an inappropriate mechanism for dealing with the needs of low income earners.
Avowing its continued faith in th, e Arbitration Court as an institution for rẽsolving industrial disputes, the Government removed the general wage order function from the Court. Under the Rẽmune~ation Act the Government had absolutẽ power to decide whether to provide for a general increase in rates of remuneration. No criteria were established for detennining the timing or level of any increases. The system seemed to give the Government both flexibility and control. In deciding the level of general increases~ it could gmnt just enough to fuel inflation. This suited the Government's "fme tuning" approa, ch to the economy. When repealing the R, emuneratiun Act, it therefore ignored union pleas for a restoration of the general wage order system, and retained the right to Regukztions, 1979) . This suggests that ~ction 4(4) of the Remuneration Act, which enabled regulations to be applied to specific groups of workers, may have been unnecessary. But, in fact, these Economic Stabilisation Regulations probably exceeded the powen given ~e Government in the Economic Stabilillltion Act. As Lance AdamsSchneider said during the debate on the Commerce Amendment Bill:
The advice I have received ... is that the Economic StabiliSiltion Act is a measure that the Government can confidently use. . . to introduce regulations for price freezes, wage controls and other facets of stabilisation over a broad economic front, but that it is not an appropriate measure under which to take action in an individual case. (Hansard, 1979, p.3603) .
Now that it has been conceded by the Government that the Economic Stabilisation Act does not enable it to regulate to alter specific wage settlements, the repeal of the Remuneration Act should mark the end of this practice-at least within existing law.
The Remuneration Act failed as an instrument of wages policy partly because there was a legacy of hostility between National Governments and the union movement dating back to 1951, fuelled by the anti-union emphasis in the party's 1975 election campaign, its policies of secret ballots on voluntary unionism and its introduction of penalty clauses into the lndustrilzl Rellltions Act in 1976. The Government had not consulted the parties before introducing the Remuneration Bill, and the Federation of Labour bitterly opposed the policies it represented. It also totally rejected the concept of the Government establishing guidelines for wage negotiations and many unions -especially those with considerable economic power -were unwilling to accept the constraints of the conciliation and arbitration system, let alone the additional restrictions of wage guidelines. The Government was naive to expect a wages policy to work which was so alien to the philosophy and mood of the union movement, yet depended so much on the co-operation of the move111ent.
The way the Act was applied also ensured that it was ineffective as a means of controlling wages. If the intention was to influence the level of the award round (Martin, p.6), because of the absence of a wage accord the Government would have had to reduce every settlement which exceeded the acceptable level. It did not reduce the metal trades and electrical workers' increases of 10.4 percent in Septentber 1979 or the watersiden' settlement of 12 percent in March 1980, despite the fact that the Government had indicated that the acceptable increase for the 1979~ round was 9.5 percent by threatening to reduce the drivers' settlement to that level. Nor did it reduce the dairy industry's settlement of 14.5 percent in September 1980 although in discussions with the Federation of Labour in August, Bolger had stated that 13 percent would be reasonable for the 1980-81 round.
One reason given for use of the Act was to cut back settlements which exceeded what would have been negotiable without direct action. But it proved difficult to decide how much of an offer was a concession to strike action. The levels which the Government announced were acceptable in the drivers' and freight forwarders' cases therefore seemed entirely arbitrary.
The Prime Minister referred to the hatntful effects on wage levels if the Kinleith settle- Act, 1979 Act, -1980 S ment tlo' w, ed on to the Auckland cor· e tradesmen's rates, and justified the regulations as an effort to prevent this. But in ord· er to prevent such a flow-on from timber workers' settlements, the Government would also have had to reduce the Tasman and Caxton agreements which were identical to that reached at Kinleith before regulations were issued. It did not do this. The need to prevent the lẽap-frogging which could develop when relativities wẽre upset. was cited as another reason for the Kinleith regulations. But the altered rates in this case compounded r· elativity problems rather than resolving them. It was also made clear that unions would not be allowed to use aUowance claims to gain overall increases in ẽxcess of trend levels. The fr· eight forwarders~ and engine drivers' regulations did prevent the unions concerned from doing this, but it was difficult to d· etermine whether it was the means used to obtain the allowances~ or the allowances themselves to which the Government objected. Th· erefore, although the Remuneration Act appeared to be a mechanism which would enable the · Government to keep control of wage movements, it was not used consistently to achiev. e this purpose. The Act was discredited as an instrument of wages policy because it appeared to be used arbitrarily and unfairly . .
The Government was seeking middle , ground with the Remuneration Act.. Frẽe wage bargaining allowed it too little control; wage controls were too rigid and created pressure on the industrial relations system. The solution seemed to be a policy which allowed a degrẽe of freedom in wage bargaining, but rẽserved the right for the Government to intervene when circumstances justified this. However, because it was inappropriate to the industrial relations environment into which it was introduced, and because of inconsistent application, · selectivẽ intervention failed as a wages control measure. Once it became an embarrassment for political and industrial relations reasons, the Remuneration Act could therefore be dispensed with from the point of view of economic policy, especially since an alternative offered itself in the fo. un of tripartite wage talks.
The Impact on Industrial Relations
It appears, both from Government statements and from the way the A· ct was used to alter awards, that the Government had three main industrial relations objectives for the Remuneration Act: to discourage the use of industrial action in support of wage claims; to reduce the influence of militants in the union movement; and to encourage the use of arbitration to resolve industrial disputes.
While the Remuneration Act was in force, the Minister of Labour rẽpeatẽdly stated the Government's view that strike action is not a legitimate weapon in wage bargaining in a democracy and that it is harn1ful to the economy. In all four cases where the Act was threatened or used to intẽrvene in an award, the unions had used strike action to for· ce their employers to concede settlements they had earlier resisted.
The Government also criticized the influenc· e of militants in the unions affected by Remuneration Regulations and linked disruptive tactics with the Socialist Unity Party. It is noteworthy that officials of the New Zealand Drivers' f · ederation, the Northern Drivers' Union, the Auckland Storemen and Packers' · union and the New Zealand Drivers' Union all featured on th· e list the Prime Minister issued on 17 March 1980, naming alleged Socialist Unity Party members influential in tradẽ unions. At the time of the Kinleith dispute, Muldoon alleged that the P. arty was uvery close" to the dispute and that the combined unions' advocate had been a founder member of the Socialist Unity Party.
The Government's desire to encourage the use of ''responsible" free wage bargaining and conciliation and arbitration rather than strike action to resolve industrial disputes was also stated frequently. All of the unions · engaged in the four disputes were known for their reluctance tu use the Arbitration Court. All have a definite 1mpact on the economy when they take strike action. These were. in fact. representative of the sorts of unions which ~an afford to operate outside thẽ conciliation and arbitration system .
It appears~ then, that some of the puzzling inconsistẽncies in the Government's application of the Remuneration Act to implement its · wages policy can be explained by its simultaneous use of the Act to mete out industrial relations penalties. A settlement was deemed to be excessive only if strike action had been used to reach 1t. Unions were irresponsible if they allowed alleged militants to lead them. And, as the saga of the drivers' dispute illustrated, the Government did not issue regulations to limit settlements reached by arbitration, even when these exceeded what the Government considered reasonable for the industry.
The result of the Government's policy in all three respects was counter-productive. Instead of reducing strike action, it provoked the general strike and prolonged the Kinleith strike by four weeks. instead of undermining the influence of "militants" it made more unionists willing to take "militant" action in the general strike or to support it fmancially at K.inleith. Instead of bolstering union confidence in the conciliation and arbitration system, it reduced it. Union publications emphasized the fact t~t as long as the Remuneration Act existed, unions could not be sure that the Government would allow the Court to arbitrate freely.
Employers were ambivalent towards the Remuneration Act. The Employers' Federation was not sorry to see the end of the general wage order system and the minimum living wage proposal. Their preferred wage control mechanism was tripartism but in principle they supported the Government's right, even responsibility, to intervene to prevent industrial action being used to obtain excessive wage settlements. Because it had no strong feelings on the Act, the Employers' Federation played a low-key role in the controversy over it, pleading only that employers should not be the innocent victims of the application of the Act as they seemed to be following Government intervention in the drivers' and Kinleith disputes, and that the Employen' Federation should be consulted before regulations were issued. This was ignored. The dispute over the Remuneration Act was essentially one between unions and the Government.
The union movement's industrial struggle against the Act itself began with the Federation of Labour's special conference on 9 August 1979, which decided to hold stopwork meetings to infornt members about the Bill, authorized the Executive to call for national action if the Government used its powers, and ordered the Federation of Labour to withdraw from the Industrial Relations Council because the Government had not consulted the council before introducing the Act. The stopwork meetings took place early in September.
The Combined State Unions also opposed the Act. Member unions used circulars, journals and discussions at timely annual conferences to explain the issues to their members. The themes of union messages to members about the Remuneration Act were simple: the Government is giving itself dictatorial powers; this is an attack on wage and salary earners; you and your union could be directly affected.
When the Prime Minister announced that the drivers' settlement would be reduced by regulation, the Meat Workers' Union stopped award negotiations in protest, and stopwork meetings in the Wellington Trades Council area called for national action. On 17 September, the Federation of Labour Executive called a 24 hour general strike for 20 September, which was supported in principle by the Combined State Unions although they considered the notice too short. Despite this, the State Services Commission estimated that 10 percent of public servants joined the strike. Shops, offices and banks were less affected than transport and manufacturing which virtually halted (Roth, 1979, 4(3) , p.S). Roth believes that at least 300,000 took part and the Chamber of Commerce estimated that $80 million worth of production and $37 million in wages were lost as a result.
(The Evening Post, 21 September 1979, p.4).
Although it was by no means general, the extent of support for the strike despite the notice is a measure both of union hostility to the Act and of the success of the Federation of Labour's drive to publicize the dangers of the Act before it was Tho impact may also be gauged by the fact that following the strike the Government retreated from its threat to use the Act against the driven.
-
The Federation of Labour choee not to make an issue of the f: .team approach, favouring rank and fde involtement in Federation of Labour activities. They shunned the close contacts with the Government favoured by Skinner, and were detertnined to intervene in industrial disputes when invited by the unions involved, with the primary aim of supporting the just claims of the unions rather than ending the dispute as soon as possible. This approach contributed a great deal to their success in handling the Kinleith strike and the campaign against the Remuneration Act. But it produced a communication gulf between the Government and the union movement which probably heightened the conflict and prevented early resolution of disputes by top level negotiation.
Knox's and Douglas's concentration on establishing the trust of unionists in their leadership, rather than on consolidating their personal bargaining relationships with the Government, therefore paid dividends by strengthening their positions in the Federation of Labour and increasing the effectiveness of the union movement as a political and industrial force.
The new Federation of Labour leadership was also responsive to Combined State Unions' efforts to establish closer working relationships between the two organisations. Although there were initial difficulties (u with the short notice over the general strike) by May 1980 it was possible for them to mount a joint political campaign in defence of living standards: for an immediate cost-of-living wage increase, a general wage order system and repeal of the Remuneration Act.
The campaign was co~rdinated centrally but organized through Trades Councils and Public Service Association sections (in the absence of a regional Combined State Union structure) .... Rank and fde involvement was achieved through meetings, rallies and pamphlets, which were used to convey information, rebut Government arguments, attract publicity and demonstrate the strength of feeling on the issues. Other tactics susgested in literature distributed to unions were to discuss the issues with friends and workmates and to send deputations to employen and let ten to Members of Parliament and newspapers.
The fact that the campaip was politicizing more and more union members as well as creating publicity for the union movement made it politically sensible for the Government to remove the major stimuli. Once another cost-of-living adjustment had been paid and an undertaking given to repeal the Remunemtion Act, early in August 1980, the political campaign ended.
The general strike was also an essentially political tactic -a protest against threa~ed use of the Remuneration Act rather than a strike in support of the drivers' right to an 11 percent increase. Although it failed to bring the country to a halt, most New Most criticism, however, concentrated on the Act~ reinforce~nent of the trend towards government by regulation (Palmer, .
that in a Parliamentary system regulations should be for machinery purposes only, and that when they go beyond that, they are the ideal instruments of despotism (1979, p.313 ). Yet the Remuneration Act gave the Gowmment powen to owrride Ieplation by reauJation.
The constitutional rectitude of the Minister's apparent announcement of the Remuneration Act on natioaal tele¥ilion and radio has also been questioned (Szakats, p.390) . Two aspects of this arou1ed concern: that the Prime Minister appeared to be using the broadcasting media rather than Parliament to announce the introduction of a Bill; and that the Government wu using the Broadcasting Corporation as a vehicle for political announcements rather than allowing it to operate as an independent branch of the media. In fact, the Prime Minister made a Ministerial Stateanent to the of Representatives at 7.30 p.m. on 24 July 1979, before broadcasting two hours later. This method of announcing policy is itself questionable howewr, because Standing Orders allow the Leader of the Opposition to make only non-controwrsial comments in reply to a Ministerial Statement (HanSIUd, 1979 (HanSIUd, , p.1763 . The Prime Minister's use of broadcasting time on 30 October 1980 to explain the repeal of the Act was certainly an abuse of the privilege. It was made two months after the announcement that the Act would be repealed. The broadcast was highly political in content, the 1rime Minister admitting that it was being made in response to a challenge from an Opposition Member of Parliament to address the nation on repeal of the Act as he had on its announcement. The Remuneration Act and its regulations also threatened the basis of the conciliation and arbitration system, which the National Party had pledged to uphold in the 1978 Manifesto (pp. 27-28).
Writing in October 1979, Szakats argued that with the Remunemtlon Act such free wage bargaining as had ever existed in New Zealand, had come to an end. He pointed out that if both voluntary and conciliated collective agreements could be declared invalid by Government regulation, "the usefulness of bargaining and ag1eeing collectively or individually has effectively been destroyed" (p.394). It is tittle wonder that the union movement was so hostile to the Act.
In announcing its intention to replace the Genert1l Wage Orders Act after an application had been lodged with the Arbitration Court, the Gowrnment usurped the right of the Court to dete1111ine an application properly brought before it (Kirk, p.3S). Comingu this did, after a series of amendments to the lnd~~&tritll Reltltioru Act altering the names and jurisdictions of the Court, it reinforced uncertainty and waning confidence in lepl methods of handling disputed wage claims (Industrilll Rellltiom Review Sept-Oct 1979, p.37).
As Ken Douglas, Secretary of the Federation of Labour, pointed out at the time, the Prime Minister's announcement that the Government would not accept an 11 percent increase in drivers' wages, the day before the driven' agreement wu to be finalized in conciliation, could be interpreted u a breach of Section 146 of the lndustrilll Rellltions
